The UK Government’s approach to international law in the Israel-Palestine context

By Catherine Maunder and Anna Balfour

 (Britain Palestine Project Fellows 2024-2025)

14 April 2025

Part One – Findings and Policy Implications

Introduction

The UK Government has consistently expressed public support for a two-state solution and has acknowledged key international legal principles in the

Israel-Palestine conflict. However, its actions often fail to uphold fully its obligations under international law. This report examines how governmental language and framing are employed to deflect or diminish responsibility in this context.

The report’s findings specifically analyse the language used since the Labour Government assumed office on 5 July 2024. It focuses on key topics, including

self-defence, genocide, ceasefire, self-determination, the right of return, war crimes and the UK’s provision of arms to Israel. A central aspect of this analysis is the identification of misapplication, highlighting instances where these legal principles are manipulated or misinterpreted to serve political or strategic objectives. This practice ultimately undermines the intended purpose of these principles within the framework of international law.

This research is based on a structured analysis of the Labour Government’s responses to the conflict following 7 Oct 2023. It draws on various primary sources, including Prime Minister’s Question Time (PMQs), parliamentary records, Government statements, and policy documents. By employing this methodological approach, the study ensures a comprehensive and well-sourced policy brief rooted in official discourse and legislative records, building upon the initial research findings.

Legal Principles

This report’s analysis of the UK Government’s language and framing regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict draws upon several key principles of international law. A brief outline of these principles, as they are applied within this report, is provided below:

1. Protection of Civilians: Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) mandates the protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict. This includes the obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to avoid targeting civilians and to take all feasible precautions to minimise harm to the civilian population.1
2. Self-Determination: This fundamental principle of international law recognises the right of peoples to freely determine their political status and pursue their own development. In the context of this report, it refers to the right of the Palestinian people to establish their own sovereign state.
3. Right to Return: UN General Assembly Resolution 194 affirms the right of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to return to their homes or receive compensation.2 This report considers the UK Government’s stance on this long-standing principle.
4. War Crimes: These are grave breaches of IHL committed during armed conflict.3 The report examines instances where actions taken in the conflict may constitute war crimes, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians or the disproportionate use of force.
5. Humanitarian Aid: IHL obligates all parties to a conflict to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief to civilians in need.4

Humanitarian Law

This report analyses the UK Government’s statements and actions concerning the provision of aid to Palestinians.

1. Security: While states have a legitimate right to ensure their security, any measures taken must be in accordance with international law.5 This report examines how the UK Government frames Israel’s security concerns in relation to international legal obligations and Palestinian rights.
2. Self-Defence: Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises the right of states to individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed attack.6 This report analyses the UK Government’s invocation of this right for Israel, considering its legal limitations and applicability in the ongoing context.
3. Genocide: Defined as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’.7 This report examines the UK Government’s position on allegations of genocide in the context of the conflict.
4. Ceasefire: A temporary or permanent cessation of hostilities. This report analyses the UK Government’s calls for a ceasefire in Gaza and its framing in relation to humanitarian needs and a long-term political solution, considering relevant international legal obligations.

Findings

Protection of Civilians

The UK Government has repeatedly emphasised its commitment to a “safe and secure Israel alongside a viable Palestinian state.”8 However, the juxtaposition of “safe and secure” for Israel versus “viable” for Palestine reflects a disparity in the prioritisation of security concerns. The first explicit mention of Palestinian security in Prime Minister’s Questions since October 2024 was made only in February 20259, underscoring the delayed and limited recognition of Palestinian suffering.

Foreign Secretary David Lammy has condemned Israeli attacks on civilian infrastructure, including schools, stating that “Israel must comply with IHL”.10 However, the UK has not taken decisive steps such as imposing an arms embargo or calling for international investigations into alleged war crimes. Instead, its policy primarily consists of expressions of concern without enforcement mechanisms.

The UK has imposed sanctions on violent Israeli settlers involved in attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank.11 While this represents a notable step, it contrasts with the Government’s failure to impose similar measures against broader Israeli military actions that have resulted in mass civilian casualties in Gaza.

Diplomatic statements emphasise the need for an immediate ceasefire, the release of hostages and the protection of civilians, yet these statements have not translated into concrete policy actions. Government officials, including Hamish Falconer, have acknowledged that “the death and destruction in Gaza is intolerable” and have called for Israel to “do much more to protect civilians, healthcare infrastructure, and humanitarian workers.”12 However, without binding legal consequences or stronger policy measures, these statements remain largely symbolic.

The UK has provided logistical support for humanitarian operations, including field hospitals and vaccination campaigns. However, access to Gaza remains restricted, and UK policies continue to rely on Israeli discretion for allowing the movement of people and aid. The UK’s diplomatic efforts, including its engagement with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian authorities, have not resulted in significant improvements in humanitarian conditions.

Policy Implications

1. The UK Government’s emphasis on Israeli security over Palestinian viability in its rhetoric may be perceived as a tacit acceptance of the current power imbalance and the ongoing occupation.
2. The lack of concrete actions beyond statements of concern regarding the protection of Palestinian civilians risks undermining the UK’s commitment to IHL.
3. The disparity in imposing sanctions on individual settlers versus broader military actions suggests an inconsistent approach to accountability for actions harming civilians.
4. Continued reliance on Israeli discretion for humanitarian access limits the effectiveness of UK aid and diplomatic efforts.

• Self-Determination

While the UK formally supports Palestinian self-determination, it has not taken meaningful steps to advance it. The statement by David Lammy that the UK will recognise a Palestinian state “at a time we determine” suggests a passive approach that prioritises political convenience over international legal commitments.13 Additionally, the UK opposes Israeli settlements, recognising them as illegal under international law, yet takes no concrete steps to enforce this stance.14

The Government’s approach is passive, delaying recognition of Palestinian statehood rather than proactively supporting it. The phrase “at a time we determine”

lacks clarity and accountability, deflecting from the urgency of the issue. There is no direct support for Palestinian state-building efforts and no condemnation of Israeli actions undermining Palestinian sovereignty through land annexation or settler violence.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s delayed and conditional approach to recognising a Palestinian State may be seen as inconsistent with its stated support for a two-state solution.
2. The failure to take concrete steps against illegal Israeli settlements undermines the UK’s stated opposition and weakens the prospects for a viable Palestinian state.
3. A passive stance on Palestinian self-determination could be interpreted as tacitly accepting the status quo and hindering progress towards a just and lasting peace.

• Right to Return

The UK Government makes no explicit reference15 to the Palestinian right to return, a principle enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194.16 While it reinstated funding to The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) after suspending it because of allegations against staff, this prioritisation of Israeli concerns over Palestinian refugee rights highlights a politicised approach to humanitarian aid.

Omitting the right to return ignores a fundamental aspect of Palestinian legal claims and weakens the discourse on displaced Palestinians as protected persons under international law. The suspension of UNRWA funding reflects a prioritisation of allegations over legal responsibilities toward Palestinian refugees. UK Government rhetoric focuses on immediate humanitarian relief rather than long-term political solutions.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s silence on the Palestinian right to return could be interpreted as a departure from established international consensus and UN resolutions.
2. The prioritisation of Israeli concerns in the UNRWA funding decision, even after reinstatement, may damage the UK’s reputation as an impartial humanitarian actor.
3. Focusing solely on immediate aid without addressing long-term issues like the right of return may perpetuate the cycle of displacement and hinder a comprehensive resolution.

• War Crimes

The UK acknowledges allegations of war crimes, with David Lammy stating that “the deliberate starvation of civilians is a war crime”.17 However, no formal legal action has followed. The UK has suspended some arms exports to Israel but maintains “steadfast support” for Israeli security, which contradicts its own legal concerns.18

The UK Government acknowledges violations but does not pursue accountability through international legal mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or International Court of Justice (ICJ). The lack of UK-backed efforts to investigate Israeli war crimes reflects an unwillingness to take concrete legal action. Sanctions and diplomatic measures against Israeli officials responsible for violations have not been pursued, despite clear statements recognising breaches of IHL.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s failure to translate its acknowledgment of potential war crimes into concrete legal action may be seen as a lack of commitment to international justice and accountability.
2. The contradiction between suspending some arms exports because of legal concerns while maintaining “steadfast support” for Israeli security creates ambiguity in the UK’s policy.
3. The absence of UK-backed investigations or support for international legal mechanisms could undermine efforts to prevent future violations.

• Humanitarian Aid

The UK Government has acknowledged Israel’s obligation to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza but has refrained from taking concrete action to ensure compliance with IHL. In a statement to Parliament, the Prime Minister reiterated that Israel must “take all possible steps to avoid civilian casualties, allow aid into Gaza in much greater volume, and provide the UN and humanitarian partners the ability to operate effectively.”19 However, this assertion falls short of holding Israel accountable for its restrictions on aid delivery or advocating for legal consequences for breaches of IHL.

Despite the ICJ mandating Israel to ensure access to life-saving aid in Gaza under Article II of the Genocide Convention20, the Israeli Government has taken steps to block aid delivery. The UK has expressed concerns over Israel’s decision to suspend funding to UNRWA, with Government officials emphasising that such measures exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. However, while the UK has called for reversing the ban, it has stopped short of identifying specific legal violations or proposing concrete enforcement mechanisms.

The UK has pledged £129m in aid to the illegally Occupied Palestinian Territories, excluding Hamas-controlled areas.21 However, the suspension and subsequent reinstatement of UNRWA funding underscore inconsistencies in the UK’s humanitarian policy. While the UK Government has consistently called for increased aid access, it has not pursued legal challenges or other decisive measures to pressure Israel into compliance with international law. Statements from British officials stress that “Israel can and must do more to get aid into Gaza,”22 yet the UK has not taken substantive action beyond diplomatic appeals.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s reliance on diplomatic appeals rather than concrete action to ensure humanitarian access may be insufficient to address the urgent needs in Gaza and uphold international law.
2. The inconsistency in the UK’s humanitarian policy, demonstrated by the suspension and reinstatement of UNRWA funding, could undermine the effectiveness and predictability of its aid efforts.
3. The failure to hold Israel accountable for restricting aid delivery may perpetuate the humanitarian crisis and weaken the UK’s credibility as a champion of humanitarian principles.

• Security

The UK continues to affirm its support for Israel’s security, maintaining that such support will be provided “in a manner consistent with our obligations to domestic and international law”.23 However, this commitment remains ambiguous regarding the extent of scrutiny applied to Israel’s actions. The UK’s suspension of specific arms exports to Israel reflects an effort to balance security assistance with compliance with IHL, yet the Government has not clarified the criteria for such restrictions or whether they will be expanded.

UK military assets have supported Israel’s defence against Iranian threats, reinforcing the Government’s alignment with Israel’s security needs.24 However, there is no comparable recognition of Palestinian security concerns, such as Israeli military incursions, settler violence or the targeting of civilian infrastructure. This imbalance highlights a security policy that primarily reinforces Israel’s military dominance while failing to address the protection of Palestinian civilians.

Questions in Parliament regarding the UK’s role in permitting military flights carrying arms to Israel have been met with opaque responses, with officials citing “operational security reasons“25 to avoid disclosure. The lack of transparency raises

concerns about the extent of UK complicity in the ongoing conflict and whether UK policies adequately account for international legal obligations.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s ambiguous commitment to supporting Israeli security “in a manner consistent with… international law” without clear parameters raises concerns about potential complicity in actions that may violate international law.
2. The disproportionate focus on Israeli security concerns over Palestinian security needs reinforces the existing power imbalance and may hinder efforts towards a just and lasting peace.
3. The lack of transparency regarding military flights carrying arms to Israel undermines public trust and accountability regarding the UK’s role in the conflict.

• Self-Defence

Lord Falconer encapsulates the British Government’s use of self-defence, stating, “The UK supports Israel’s right to self-defence, but it must do so in accordance with IHL.”26

The UK Government has consistently reaffirmed its support for Israel’s right to self-defence, as reflected in statements from Lord Falconer and Prime Minister Keir Starmer, “We support Israel’s right to defend herself against Iran’s aggression in line with international law”.27 However, this position lacks clarity on key legal considerations. The framing does not specify whether self-defence is directed against state or non-state actors, the applicable legal limits (necessity and proportionality) or the timeframe in which such a right applies (initial attack versus ongoing conflict).

Furthermore, the UK Government’s position raises concerns regarding the application of international law to the conflict in Gaza, particularly concerning the asymmetry between a State (Israel) and a Non-State Actor (Hamas). This debate is on whether Israel’s actions align with international law, considering the scope of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in situations involving Non-State Actors28. While Article 51 grants States the right to self-defence against armed attacks, its application in contexts involving Non-State Actors, such as Hamas, is contested. Notably, UK officials refrain from recognising any right of self-defence for Palestine, omitting reference to international law regarding resistance under occupation. This selective application of legal principles reinforces Israel’s security concerns while disregarding Palestinian claims, raising concerns about the UK’s legal and diplomatic consistency in the region.

Policy Implications

1. By endorsing Israel’s right to self-defence without specifying its scope (i.e. against state versus non-state actors) or its adherence to principles of necessity and proportionality29, the UK risks appearing inconsistent in its application of international law.
2. The omission of Palestine’s right to self-defence, despite international legal debates on resistance under occupation, reinforces perceptions of legal bias.
3. By failing to set clear legal parameters for Israel’s self-defence, the UK risks tacitly endorsing military actions that may exceed international legal limits.

• Genocide

The UK Government has not officially recognised Israel’s actions as genocide, instead only acknowledging the allegations made in the ICJ Case 192, South Africa v Israel (26 January 2024).30 The Foreign Secretary has denied that genocide is taking place, further suggesting that “the Israeli military has not yet reached the threshold of killings that would legally constitute genocide under international law”.31

The ICC has historically used genocide charges in cases where there is substantial evidence of systematic and targeted destruction of a particular group. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, have confirmed genocide in Gaza, citing widespread destruction, mass civilian casualties, and policies that target Palestinian civilians disproportionately.32

While the UK Government remains hesitant to label Israel’s actions as genocide, multiple reports indicate that Israel has engaged in at least three of the five acts that legally define genocide under international law. These include:

1. Killing group members (Death Toll – 62, 614).33
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (Injured – 111, 588).34
3. Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part.

Policy Implications

1. The UK’s reluctance to acknowledge genocide allegations risks undermining its credibility in advocating for international human rights norms.
2. Continued inaction could set a precedent for the selective application of genocide definitions, weakening global enforcement mechanisms.
3. As further evidence emerges from the ICJ proceedings, the UK Government may face increasing domestic and international pressure to reassess its stance.

• Ceasefire

A ceasefire is essential for addressing the humanitarian crisis and advancing a political resolution in line with international law. David Lammy (2024)35 has emphasised the urgency of a ceasefire, highlighting its role in enabling aid delivery and initiating steps toward a two-state solution. He has directly conveyed this stance to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, reaffirming the UK’s diplomatic commitment to ending hostilities. 

However, the UK’s framing of the ceasefire as a necessary step toward political resolution risks implying that Israel’s military actions are justified while overlooking the broader context of occupation and blockade. Additionally, while international law mandates the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid regardless of ceasefire conditions, the UK’s messaging may reinforce the perception that aid is contingent on political agreements rather than a legal obligation.

“We need a ceasefire to ensure that that can happen, that aid desperately needed can get into the region and we can begin the path to a two-state solution now.”36

Framing the two-state solution as something that must “begin”37 suggests it is a political choice rather than an existing legal right under international law, as affirmed by the UN Charter, ICJ rulings and General Assembly Resolutions. By not explicitly acknowledging Palestinian statehood rights, the argument for self-determination as a legal right, rather than just a diplomatic goal, is undermined. Moreover, despite rhetorical support for a ceasefire, no UK-led diplomatic initiatives actively push for one, limiting the credibility of the UK’s role in peace efforts. The UK must align its ceasefire advocacy with existing international legal obligations and UN resolutions affirming Palestinian statehood to maintain legal and diplomatic consistency.

Policy Implications

1. By framing the ceasefire as necessary for aid access, the UK risks misrepresenting international law, which mandates the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance regardless of ongoing hostilities. This could weaken the UK’s credibility in advocating for compliance with IHL.
2. The implication that a two-state solution must “begin” rather than being a recognised legal right under UN resolutions downplays Palestinian self-determination as an established legal principle.
3. Despite public calls for a ceasefire, the UK has not initiated concrete diplomatic measures to achieve one, reducing its influence in peace negotiations. Without active engagement in ceasefire mediation, the UK risks being perceived as offering rhetorical support without substantive action.

Conclusion

The current situation in Israel-Palestine reflects a pattern of rhetorical commitment to international law while failing to implement meaningful actions to uphold it. Through vague language, passive policies and selective enforcement, the UK effectively diminishes its responsibility for addressing violations of Palestinian rights.

Without substantive changes in its diplomatic and legal strategies, the UK Government remains complicit in the ongoing undermining of international law in the illegally occupied territories.

Our recommendations

Part Two – Policy Recommendations

(Developed in Response to the Policy Implications Outlined in Part One)

Protection of Civilians

• Adopting a balanced rights-based narrative by reframing official rhetoric to emphasise Palestinian rights and viability alongside Israeli security equally. This includes publicly acknowledging the impact of occupation and the need to end systemic inequalities as part of any sustainable peace process.

• Taking concrete actions to protect civilians. This should move beyond expressions of concern by supporting and initiating international investigations into civilian harm, advocating for ceasefires and imposing targeted sanctions on all individuals—military or settler—credibly implicated in violations of international law.

• Ensure consistency in UK accountability measures. Broaden the scope of accountability to include military and political actors responsible for civilian harm, not just individual settlers. This would demonstrate that the UK sanctions policy is based on legal principles rather than political selectivity.
• Condition diplomatic engagement on compliance with international law. Including tying aspects of UK-Israeli diplomatic and economic cooperation to clear benchmarks on civilian protection, aid access and human rights compliance. This approach ensures the UK’s influence is used constructively to uphold legal and ethical standards.

Self-Determination

• Recognising the state of Palestine without further delay or preconditions. Align recognition with international legal principles and the right to self-determination, signalling a genuine commitment to a two-state framework and countering the narrative of UK complicity in the status quo.

• Taking concrete action against illegal settlements. Move beyond rhetorical condemnation by implementing targeted measures such as banning trade with settlements, reviewing bilateral agreements that may indirectly support settlement expansion and supporting international legal efforts addressing settlement illegality.

Right to Return

• Reaffirming support for the Palestinian Right of Return. Publicly acknowledge the right of return outlined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and frame it as a core issue in any comprehensive peace agreement. This would align the UK with international consensus and support a just resolution for refugees.
• Ensure consistency and transparency in UNRWA funding. Reinforce long-term commitments to UNRWA based on humanitarian need, not political pressure. The UK should separate funding decisions from geopolitical considerations to maintain credibility as a neutral donor.

War Crimes

• Supporting independent investigations into war crimes. Actively back impartial investigations by international bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN fact-finding missions, regardless of the actors involved, and publicly affirm the importance of accountability under international law.

• Align arms export policy with legal and ethical standards. Conduct a comprehensive review of arms exports to all parties involved in conflict, ensuring full compliance with domestic and international legal obligations. Where credible risk of misuse exists, suspend licenses transparently and consistently.

• Clarify policy on security support. Reframe the UK’s support for Israeli security in terms of adherence to international law and protection of all civilians. This avoids the perception of bias and reinforces the principle that security and accountability are not mutually exclusive.

Humanitarian Aid

• Move beyond diplomatic appeals to enforce humanitarian access. Leverage diplomatic, legal and economic tools to pressure all parties to comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), including unimpeded access for aid into Gaza. This may include advocating for binding UN resolutions, supporting humanitarian corridors, or conditioning bilateral engagements on compliance.

• Develop a consistent and transparent framework that guides UK humanitarian engagement, grounded in international law and humanitarian principles. This would help prevent politicised disruptions like the UNRWA funding suspension and ensure aid decisions are predictable and principled.

• Increase long-term humanitarian and reconstruction support. Commit to sustained support for Gaza’s recovery, including healthcare, water, sanitation and infrastructure rebuilding, to address immediate humanitarian needs and long-term resilience.

Security

• Define legal parameters for security support. Clarify the conditions under which UK support for Israeli security aligns with international law. This includes publishing legal assessments related to arms exports and ensuring that all military assistance is conditional on compliance with IHL.

• Balance security discourses by publicly and diplomatically recognising Palestinian security needs alongside Israeli concerns, advocating for equal protection of civilians on both sides. This would demonstrate the UK’s commitment to a balanced and rights-based approach to conflict resolution.

Self-Defence

• Clarify legal boundaries of self-defence. Clearly defined in official communications is that any endorsement of a state’s right to self-defence, such as Israel’s, must comply with international legal principles, including necessity, proportionality and distinction between combatants and civilians. Specify whether the right is exercised in response to state or non-state actors.
• Promote balanced legal language in diplomatic statements. Ensure that official UK statements reflect the equal application of IHL and avoid language that may be interpreted as one-sided or politically motivated.

Genocide

• Acknowledging the seriousness of genocide allegations. Publicly recognise that genocide allegations under investigation, such as those before the International Court of Justice, warrant careful legal consideration; and affirm the UK’s support for due process and international accountability.

• Commit to a rules-based approach, not political calculations. Avoid preemptive dismissal or selective engagement with genocide claims based on political alliances. Instead, pledge to respond consistently to credible legal findings, reinforcing the universality of genocide prevention norms.

Ceasefire

• Uphold the legal obligation for humanitarian access, independent of ceasefire conditions. It clearly states that under IHL, all parties to a conflict must allow unimpeded humanitarian access regardless of ceasefire status. Reframe aid-related statements to reflect this legal requirement, reinforcing the UK’s role as a principled advocate for humanitarian norms.
• Affirm Palestinian self-determination as a legal right. Publicly recognise Palestinian self-determination not as a political aspiration but as a binding legal right grounded in UN resolutions and international law. UK statements and their use of legal language should reference this explicitly to maintain alignment with the rules-based global order.

Catherine Maunder is a Bar Course student at the Inns of Court College of Advocacy with a background in Law and Politics and International Human Rights; Anna Balfour works as a news and media researcher with a background in Violence, Terrorism and Security (MA) and International Relations (MA hons). Both are Fellows of the Balfour Project/Britain Palestine Project 2024-2025.

Endnotes

1 Article 75 – Fundamental Guarantees, Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts

2 UN General Assembly Resolution 194

3 Rule 156 – Definition of War Crimes found in Customary International Humanitarian Law

4 Rule 55 – Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need found in Customary International 

5 Article 1(1) – United Nations Charter 1945

6 Article 51 – United Nations Charter 1945

7 Article 2 – Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951

8 Keir Starmer’s First Prime Minister’s Questions as Prime Minister – 24th July 2024

9 Prime Minister’s Questions – 5 February 2025

10 ‘Only with diplomacy can we deliver long-term peace’ David Lammy, 14 August 2024

11 ‘New UK sanctions target illegal outposts and organisations supporting extremist Israeli settlers in the West Bank’ David Lammy, 15 October 2024

12 Occupied Territories: Human Rights – 12 December 2024 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Chris Law, Scottish National Party and Mr Hamish Falconer Hamish Falconer, 20 September 2024

13 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024, House of Commons, 29 January 2025

14 ibid

15 E3 Foreign Ministers’ statement on the implementation of legislation against United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) David Lammy, 31 January 2025

16 UN General Assembly Resolution 194

17 ‘Only with diplomacy can we deliver long-term peace’ David Lammy, 14 August 2024

18 ibid

19 Prime Minister’s Questions, 16 October 2024

20 Article 2 – Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 1951

21 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024, House of Commons, 29 January 2025

22 Prime Minister’s Questions – 4 September 2024

23 Prime Minister’s Questions – 23 October 2024

24 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024, House of Commons, 29 January 2025

25 Ammunition: Israel 25 November 2024

Brian Leishman, Labour MSP and Luke Pollard: Lead Defence Minister for Overseas Territories & Labour MSP

26 Occupied Territories: Human Rights – 12 December 2024 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Chris Law, Scottish National Party and Mr Hamish Falconer

27 PM statement to the House of Commons on 7 October anniversary and the Middle East: 7 October 2024 – 7 October 2024

Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer KCB KC MP

28 Article 51 – United Nations Charter 1945

29 Necessity and Proportionality are fundamental requirements, often stemming from human rights law and principles of good governance, demanding that any interference with rights or any action taken by a public authority must be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, meaning there is no less intrusive way to achieve that aim, and proportionate, meaning the benefits of the action must outweigh the negative impact on the rights and interests of individuals or groups.

30 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024, House of Commons, 29 January 2025

31 Prime Ministers Questions – 24 July 2024

32 Amnesty International investigation concludes Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza  – 5 December 2024

33 Israel-Gaza war in maps and charts: Live tracker -9 October 2023 Al Jazeera

34 ibid

35https://www.gov.uk/government/news/its-never-too-late-for-peace-in-the-middle-east-we-m

ust-break-the-cycle-of-violence – 18 October 2024

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon David Lammy MP

36 Prime Ministers Questions  – 4 September 2024

37 Prime Ministers Questions – 4 September 2024