Two Palestinians look with trepidation to the medium- and short-term future. First, Muhammad Shehada explains that, after this first phase, Israel will hold onto a fully depopulated 58 per cent of Gaza including almost all its agricultural land and, even after its withdrawal in the second phase of the agreement, will continue to hover over the rest of the territory where its proxy gangs (Abu Shabab et al) will continue its dirty work.
Second, Jonathan Kuttab spells out the deficiencies in the Trump Plan saying that “Given the mistrust between the parties, and the history of breaches and violations of agreements, it barely warrants labelling the plan a ceasefire agreement.”
12 Oct 2025
After the hostage release, Israel will hold onto a fully depopulated 58 per cent of Gaza. After an international force enters, Israel will hold onto 40 per cent of Gaza where the IDF’s proxy gangs will thrive, writes Muhammad Shehada. Genocide or reconstruction? The devil is in the details.
Right now, the 58 per cent beyond the yellow line is not only under IDF control, it is fully depopulated. Any Gaza civilian that tries to enter is shot on sight. Israel killed 35 Gazans in the first 24 hours of the ceasefire. Israel is planning to hold onto those areas for a long time
Israel’s proxy gangs (e.g. Abu Shabab, Husam al-Astal, Ashraf Mansi) are all currently hiding in the 58 per cent of Gaza the IDF is stationed in. Israel cultivated those gangs to create “gated communities” (concentration camps) to push Gazans into. Now with the ceasefire, Israel is using those gangs to launch attacks on Hamas deep inside Gaza without the IDF having to invade.
This is Israel’s way of saying “we’re not violating the ceasefire, it’s Palestinians killing Palestinians.”
Israel will also try to get Gazans to move into those areas with promises of a better life while the other half of Gaza remains reduced to rubble.
Israel conditioned its withdrawal from an additional 18 per cent of Gaza on the creation of an international force on the ground (the IDF would still keep 40 per cent of Gaza). Hamas was okay with a similar force during the Jan-March 2025 ceasefire; an Egyptian-Qatari checkpoint in Netzarim
But Israel’s Defence Minister has made clear that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu wants the international force to act as a subcontractor of the IDF and pursue Hamas tunnels and infrastructure. If the international force would not, the IDF would. This would put the international force and Hamas on a collision course, as the latter would be seen as an occupying power trying to accomplish what Israel failed to do militarily during 24 months of genocide—that is to dismantle Hamas and force Gazans into submission
Israel made it a condition that the withdrawal to the “security buffer zone” (18 per cent of Gaza) include the international force disarming Hamas. The earlier Trump plan talked only of “decommissioning” Hamas’ “offensive weapons” (i.e. rockets/tunnels).
But Netanyahu changed it to “all military, terror and offensive infrastructure” which means fully stripping Hamas and all Gaza of any weapons, including firearms or even knives, which is an elusive process that would allow Israel to never withdraw. It would also allow Israel to bomb Gaza at will and claim it was neutralising a Hamas cell (as with Lebanon).
The 58 per cent Israel currently controls constitutes Gaza’s food basket; almost all agricultural lands (most are in the 18 per cent “security buffer zone”). Without those areas, Gazans would be entirely dependent on international. aid indefinitely and people would be forced into half of the Gaza area
As Israel freezes the IDF withdrawal lines from Gaza and turns the genocide into a low-intensity campaign, the prospect of Israeli settlers moving in increases dramatically. A thousand settler families are already waiting at Gaza’s borders with tents and caravans, ready to move in at the earliest chance.
Even if Hamas accepts all of Trump’s plan unconditionally, in phase 2 of the negotiations, Israel would still retain 40 per cent of Gaza, depopulated and occupied by the IDF, since the plan leaves it to Israel’s discretion when and how to withdraw. The vague language on disarmament would allow Israel to claim that, even if Hamas lays down all its weapons, there are still other smaller factions or terror cells or armed individuals who “pose a threat” to Israel (who is to verify those claims? Would it be Trump?)
Israel can come up with an infinite number of pretexts to keep its 40 per cent of Gaza for as long as it wants (and possibly start moving settlers there). If Hamas or any other Palestinian armed factions try to challenge this, they would be blamed for the collapse of the ceasefire. In other words, Israel just established a Berlin Wall-like line that is there to stay for a long time.
IDF plans to continue to cultivate criminal gangs there and send them to carry out attacks on the ground while Israel bombs Gaza from the air under flimsy pretexts. More aid will enter, but that is about it. Reconstruction, rebuilding the economy, reopening Gaza to the world are all left to Israel’s discretion.
The agreed phase 1 of the plan currently talks about allowing temporary housing solutions (e.g. caravans, tents) and reconstructing hospitals and bakeries, but not the 92 per cent of homes that have been destroyed.
The Trump-Netanyahu plan for Gaza: a legal analysis that finds it full of holes
By Jonathan Kuttab
The Arab Centre, Washington DC
9 Oct 2025
(Extracts from a longer article)
The Trump plan is not an agreement per se but purports to provide a framework for a future agreement (or agreements). The initial part of the plan calls for Israel and Hamas to accept its terms within three or four days. Hamas’s refusal means that Trump would give Netanyahu the green light to defeat Hamas by any and all means necessary. The initial stage of the plan, involving the release of Hamas’s hostages, was very specific and had to be fulfilled within 72 hours followed by the release of Palestinian prisoners. But the plan’s remaining provisions are open to interpretation. The Plan suffers from the following deficiencies:
- It is unclear who the other parties to the agreement are. Will they be Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, or some other combination? This is crucial, because the first important part of any agreement is to know who the parties are and to bind them to specific obligations and commitments or grant them specific rights and benefits. Will the other parties be required to provide guarantees for the implementation of the agreements? Will they participate in the mechanisms for security or governance of Gaza after the withdrawal of Israeli forces?
- It is not stated who will select the technocratic, apolitical Palestinian Committee charged with governing daily affairs in Gaza. Besides the provision that they must not be members of Hamas, the criteria and mechanism for their selection and appointment are unclear. Reports suggest that different families are being contacted to seek their views and suggestions for candidates for these positions.
- It is unclear who will select or announce the members of “the Board of Peace” which apparently will have ultimate authority in governing the Gaza Strip.
- The reform programme for the Palestinian Authority is likely to be controversial. While the Plan refers to “various proposals, including Trump’s peace plan of 2020 and the Saudi French Proposal,” these documents are often contradictory and do not specify what is required of the Palestinian Authority or who will determine whether the PA has reformed sufficiently to meet the requirements. This provision is important since the staged withdrawals of Israeli forces from Gaza are specifically linked to PA reform and its capacity to fulfil the responsibilities of governance and security provision after it assumes authority for the Strip. Given the fact that Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that the Palestinian Authority will not be allowed to play any part in governing Gaza, the vague requirements for successful reform provide the perfect tool to exclude the PA from governance.
- The plan fails to designate the basic law or legal principles that govern the process. Even a simple contract between two parties usually provides that the agreement is to be governed by the law of a particular state, for example. For international agreements, reference is usually made to international law and the legal principles that govern the agreement.
- The plan offers no mechanism for interpreting its provisions. This absence is a fatal flaw, as the plan itself is insufficiently clear or detailed. Even if it were more detailed, issues of interpretation will always arise. Who will decide between conflicting interpretations of the plan?
- The plan makes no provision for resolving conflicts between the parties, or for dealing with additional issues that will inevitably arise during its implementation. Will disputes be settled by arbitration, mediation, the International Court of Justice, or fiat by some superior party?
- As in past plans and agreements, the Trump Plan fails to provide penalties in case of clear breaches of its provisions. It does provide that regional parties (yet unnamed) will provide guarantees that Hamas will abide by its obligations. It is nevertheless unclear who these guarantors are and what guarantees are being provided. At the same time, the plan asks no party to guarantee that Israel will fulfil its obligations under the plan and does not specify what consequences Israel may face if it fails to fulfil its obligations. This element is particularly important considering statements by Netanyahu that the Israeli army is not going to withdraw from most of Gaza in the foreseeable future and in light of the previous actions of both Netanyahu and Trump himself in breaching various treaties and agreements. The absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the much more detailed 1993 Oslo Accords is now widely accepted as contributing to its failure to deliver a comprehensive peace. The initial 15 Jan 2025 ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel contained detailed provisions for three stages, but after the first stage Israel ended that agreement and resumed the bombing and blockade of Gaza after Hamas handed over many of the hostages it was holding. A similar fate would seem to await this agreement.
- Article 15 states that a “deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.” Again, there are no guidelines for the agreement, no process for reaching it, and no thought as to what would happen if an agreement cannot be reached.
- Article 16 states that Israel will withdraw based on “standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarisation that will be agreed upon between the IDF, the International Security Force (ISF), the guarantors and the United States.” The guarantors have not been named, and the ISF has not yet been formed. This provision alone effectively gives Israel veto power over withdrawal, which may never in fact occur. The provision also states that the objective of the guidelines for the withdrawal is to ensure a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt or its citizens. The reference to Gaza’s citizens provides an opportunity to interfere—or to delay withdrawal—based not only on perceived threats to Israel, but also on perceived threats to Gaza’s citizens which may presumably come from Hamas or other parties. This loophole would provide the legal basis for undermining any Palestinian Authority (or any local authority) or a pretext for future interference in Palestinian affairs.
In summary, the plan provides for an initial pause in hostilities and the exchange of prisoners and hostages but lacks the mechanisms necessary to ensure its own implementation. Given the mistrust between the parties, and the history of breaches and violations of agreements, it barely warrants labelling the plan a ceasefire agreement. Trump’s proposal certainly does not merit the title of a plan for ending the conflict and ushering in a new era of peace and prosperity for the people of Gaza and the region.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Centre, Washington DC, its staff or its Board of Directors.